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1 Introduction
How do uncertainty and the state of the business cycle aect the eectiveness of scal
policy? Economic models incorporating non-convex adjustment costs, as in Bloom et al.
(2012), suggest that high levels of uncertainty make agents more cautious when taking
investment/hiring decisions, thereby reducing the eect of scal policy.1 Michaillat
(2014) argues that slackness in the economy will improve the eectiveness of some
scal policies.2 In this paper we attempt to shed light on this question by empirically
characterising how uncertainty and the state of the business cycle inuence the eects
of government spending.
Our empirical strategy is based on a nonlinear structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) that allows for diering eects of government spending shocks during times
of high (HU) and low (LU) uncertainty, or during times of recession (R) and boom (B).
Following Bloom (2009), we identify periods of HU as those with unusually high stock
market volatility. We dene periods of R and B following the NBER's recording of the
dates of business cycles. Exogenous shocks to government spending are identied using
two alternative strategies. In the rst case, the shocks are identied as the residuals in
a SVAR that imposes the exclusion restriction that government spending cannot react
within one quarter to shocks to output and tax revenues, as pioneered by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). In the second case, we follow a narrative approach and identify
government spending shocks using the news about future defence spending produced
by Ramey (2011a). The narratively identied shocks are then classied according to
whether they occur during times of HU or LU or, alternatively, during times of R or B.
This second framework allows us to address issues as anticipation eects of the shocks,
and oers an alternative assessment of the exogeneity of the shocks. We apply this
methodology to US data between 1948 Q1 and 2007 Q4.
The results suggest that the response of output to a positive government shock is
negative during times of HU or R and positive during times of LU or B. Interestingly,
the two identication strategies achieve very similar results. These results can be un-
derstood in the light of a framework where information is scarce or noisy during times
1Bloom et al. (2012) develop a model in which uncertainty is time-varying and aects the volatility
of technology shocks, and rms are heterogeneous and face non-convex adjustment costs in capital
and labour. Fiscal policy is modelled as a wage subsidy. The eect of such a policy is smaller when
the policy is implemented at the time uncertainty rst hits the economy but slightly larger when the
policy is conducted one year later.
2Michaillat (2014) considers a New Keynesian model with a search and matching friction where an
increase in the size of the public workforce during periods of slack (unemployment increases from 5
to 8%) doubles its eect (as measured by the additional number of workers employed when one more
worker is employed in the public sector) compared to that under non-recessionary conditions.
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of HU. In this context, agents are concerned that the economy may take a downturn
and reduce their future levels of income. A government spending shock during times
of heightened uncertainty may then simply conrm these pessimistic views, in turn
producing a decline in consumption and activity. We nd evidence of measures of
household-sector condence reacting negatively to a government spending shock during
times of HU, together with consumption and prices.
The results we obtain contrast with previous literature that nds government spend-
ing shocks to be more eective in stimulating the economy during periods of R than B
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)). We reconcile the two views and conclude that
these dierences arise from the information used to dene periods of R.
By using the VAR framework to obtain impulse response functions, we are imposing
the restriction that responses are xed for each regime (history-independence). We
check whether this is an issue using the local projections of Jorda (2005), as suggested
in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014).
Traditional empirical research on scal policy, starting with the inuential work of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and subsequent papers such as Ramey (2011a) and Barro
and Redlick (2011),3 has focused on the linear eects of scal policy (i.e. the eect of the
scal policy is assumed to be the same regardless of potentially changing conditions).
The conclusion of the above research is that government spending stimulates economic
activity, although the precise impact, as measured by the so-called scal multiplier, is
still controversial (Hall (2010)).4 Another strand of the literature suggests the opposite
eect: government spending cuts have expansionary eects under certain conditions.
This is the implication of work by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Ardagna
(2013).5
There is, however, a recent emphasis on allowing for nonlinear eects of scal pol-
icy, as highlighted in Parker (2011). Corsetti et al. (2013) suggest that the health of
public nances might not only aect the magnitude but also the sign of the response
of output to government spending. In recessions in an economy with a high level of
debt and where monetary policy is constrained (e.g. because of the zero lower bound),
an increase in government spending may increase the probability of default, lowering
demand. Under certain conditions, the multiplier can shift from positive to zero, or
even become negative and large.6
3Other works on the economic eects of government spending include, for example, Ramey and
Shapiro (1998), Burnside et al. (2004), Perotti (2004) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
4The government spending multiplier is dened as the ratio of output change to an exogenous
discretionary increase in government spending. See Ramey (2011b) for a survey on the scal multiplier.
5See Alesina (2010) for a review of the expansionary eects of scal consolidations.
6An increasing number of studies are also investigating whether the government spending multiplier
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Bertola and Drazen (1993) and Bi et al. (2013) argue that expectations about future
government spending can also generate nonlinear eects. These authors explore the
idea that cuts in government spending can cause an economic expansion if they induce
agents to believe that government spending will be higher in the future. Bi et al. (2013)
build on this idea and suggest that changes in agents' expectations about scal policy
(the timing of it and instruments used) can generate positive or negative eects on
economic activity, depending on other elements of the economy such as the monetary
policy stance or the level of government debt.
A growing body of evidence (Bloom (2009), Baker et al. (2013)) suggests that un-
certainty does have a negative eect on economic activity. However, no research so
far provides empirical evidence on how uncertainty aects scal policy.7 This ques-
tion could have important implications from a policy-making standpoint, regarding the
extent to which a scal intervention may be appropriate during a period of turmoil.
Our work does relate to an increasing amount of empirical studies focusing on
whether business cycle conditions are associated with nonlinear eects of scal pol-
icy, for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Mittnik and Semmler (2012), Fazzari et al. (2012),
Bognanni (2012), Owyang et al. (2013), Ramey and Zubairy (2014) and Caggiano et al.
(2015).8 However, the variety of methodologies employed and the heterogeneity in the
denitions of what can be considered a recession (or a slack economy) yield very dier-
ent results. Some of these studies nd that recessions or periods of slack in the economy
make government spending a particularly powerful tool. This is true of Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012), one of the most prominent studies in this body of literature.
These authors use a smooth-transition SVAR in which the probability of recession is
weighted by a seven-period centred moving average of the growth rate of output, their
measure of the state of the business cycle. Bognanni (2012) nds the opposite: a smaller
multiplier during recessions in a Markov-switching VAR in which the probability of re-
cession is estimated period by period. Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy
can be higher during times when the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds. Christiano
et al. (2011) argue that large shocks to preferences regarding intertemporal substitution can lead to
liquidity traps. In such cases, government spending, by causing ination, will stimulate output by a
much bigger magnitude than during normal times (impact multiplier of 1.6; Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2012) nd an impact multiplier of 3 in a nonlinear setting). However, Mertens and Ravn (2014) argue
that this eect could be the opposite if we consider that the liquidity trap is caused by an exogenous
(sunspot) shock to condence that drives a shift from optimism to pessimism.
7Aastveit et al. (2013) investigate the eects of uncertainty on the eectiveness of monetary policy.
8Bruckner and Tuladhar (2013) explore the eect of scal policy during times of nancial crisis.
The authors nd that rms' nancial distress (as measured by a reduction in their net worth because
of lower commercial land prices) implies a signicantly lower government spending multiplier.
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(2014), meanwhile, nd no impact of the state of the business cycle on government
spending multipliers.
The present analysis diers from the studies just cited in two important dimensions.
First, we use a simple and transparent methodology that allows estimation by OLS and
the implementation of dierent identication strategies for government spending shocks.
Second, instead of estimating the probability of recession, or using other variables as
ways to estimate the output gap, we employ the denition the NBER uses to measure
recession.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strat-
egy and presents the results obtained from the dierent methods employed to identify
the government spending shocks. Since our ndings are in striking contrast to previous
conclusions in the literature, we investigate the sources of these dierences. Section 3
contains dierent robustness tests for the results of the benchmark specications. Sec-
tion 4 concludes and oers directions for future research.
2 Empirical Strategy
The empirical literature on the eects of scal policy disagrees on which is the best way
to identify government spending shocks. The two most commonly used frameworks
dier in their assumptions and in the results obtained (see Hall (2010)).9 The Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) methodology makes use of an SVAR and identies exogenous
government spending shocks as the only ones that can aect government spending con-
temporaneously. The second method identies government spending shocks following
Ramey and Shapiro (1998), who use unexpected changes in defence spending. While
recognising that both frameworks have their merits, here we do not take a stance on
the suitability of each one but instead use both. They will be described in more detail
below.
To dene periods of HU we follow the methodology and data described in Bloom
(2009). Bloom (2009) constructs a monthly measure of uncertainty using the VXO
index of implied volatility from 1986 onwards and using the actual monthly return
volatilities of the SP500 index between 1962 and 1986.10 We extend these estimates
back to 1948. Major uncertainty events are selected as those months which have a
stock market volatility of 1.65 standard deviations above a Hodrick-Prescott trend
9An alternative method would be to restrict the sign of some responses of the system to achieve
identication, as in Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
10The adequacy of stock market volatility as a measure of uncertainty is also documented in Bloom
et al. (2007).
5
(with a smoothing coecient of 129,600). Since our sample has a quarterly frequency,
we consider periods of HU to be those quarters containing any of the monthly events
described above.11 Periods of LU are dened as the rest of the quarters.
The denition of quarters of R or B is done by following the business cycle dates
produced by the NBER. Figure 1 shows the quarters of HU (32 in total) and those of
R (35).12
For both specications the data used contains real federal government spending,
output and tax revenues in per capita terms as described in the Appendix. Our sample
starts in 1948q1 and nishes in 2007q4.
2.1 The SVAR Approach
To capture the potentially dierent contemporaneous and dynamic responses of the
variables to government spending shocks, we estimate an otherwise standard SVAR with
dummy variables that provide information about the change in economic conditions
(from times of LU to HU or between R and B):
xt = BL(L)xt 1 + (BH(L) BL(L))Htxt 1 + et (1)
et =Dt"t (2)
Dt = (DL +DHHt) (3)
where xt = [gt; yt; trt]
0 and et  N (0;DtD0t) is a vector of residuals which are linear
combinations of the structural shocks "t  N (0; I). B(L) = (I B1L B2L2 : : :BpLp)
represents a lag polynomial of order p.13
Ht is a dummy variable that takes a value of one during periods of HU (or R,
depending on the analysis).14 When Ht = 0, the dynamic lagged variables aect the
system through BL(L), and when Ht = 1 through BH(L), allowing for a potentially
dierent dynamic response in the system. The contemporaneous response matrix Dt is
also allowed to be state-dependent, changing during periods of LU or B (matrix DL)
and periods of HU or R (matrix DH). The specication also includes a state-varying
constant and a quadratic trend (as emphasised in Francis and Ramey (2009)).
11The results are very similar when we consider quarterly volatility (instead of monthly) and pick
up the periods with unusually high values.
12See Bloom (2009) for a complete characterisation and description of the HU events since 1962.
13We set p = 4 following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ramey (2011a).
14Some studies (see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)) advocate using Ht 1 instead of Ht to
avoid contemporaneous feedback from scal policies into the state of the economy. Our results are
similar regardless of which specication we use.
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In the framework of this subsection, exogenous shocks to government spending are
identied using an exclusion restriction: government spending does not react contem-
poraneously to other structural shocks. This assumption implies that there is a time
lag of one quarter required to enact public spending bills. Following Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), the plausibility of this restriction rests on the minimum required time
that the scal authority faces when adjusting government spending to surprise changes
in scal (as measured by shocks to tax revenues ) or general (as measured by shocks to
output) macroeconomic conditions. To implement this restriction, the matrixDt is ob-
tained from a Choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the relevant
residuals from equation 1, where government spending is ordered rst.
To prevent the nonlinearities that are present in equation 1 from altering the original
Blanchard-Perotti identication assumption, we impose 0 coecients on the matrix
B1(L) = BH(L) BL(L) for the government equation. Therefore, government spending
shocks "gt are identied, in line with Blanchard and Perotti (2002), from:
gt =
pX
j=1
g0;jxt j + "
g
t
When we do not allow for dierential responses due to changing economic distinc-
tions, i.e. Ht = 0 for all periods, equation 1 reduces to a standard linear SVAR model:
xt = B(L)xt 1 +D"t (4)
We start by estimating equation 4 to establish a comparison with previous work.
Figure 2 shows the responses of the variables in the system to a positive shock in
government spending that raises government spending by 1% at its peak. The gure also
shows 68% and 95% condence intervals, computed using a non-parametric bootstrap
method.15 The response of output is positive throughout the horizon (20 quarters).
The implied elasticity of the GDP on impact with respect to the government spending
peak is 0.045. When translated into multiplier terms, the impact multiplier is 0.46,
increasing to 0.85 at the peak.16 The results are qualitatively similar (although slightly
smaller in size) to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), with output reaching its peak impact
after the fourth year).
We now relax the implied assumption that changes in government spending always
15To compute the condence intervals, we generate 100,000 bootstrap draws of the endogenous
variables using the estimated coecients (B^H(L) and B^L(L)) and residuals (e^t) from equation 1. We
re-estimate the VAR using the bootstrap samples and compute the 68th and 95th percentiles of the
resulting impulse responses.
16The ratio of nominal GDP to nominal federal government spending in our sample is 10.13.
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have the same eect. When allowing for nonlinearities as described in equation 1, the
results change dramatically. We start with the case where Ht takes a value of 1 during
periods of HU as described above. Figure 3 shows the responses to a positive shock
to government spending. The rst panel (in blue) shows the responses of the variables
in the system during times of LU. The response of output is slightly higher than in
Figure 2 (0.56 on impact, implying an impact multiplier of almost 0.6, and about 1 at
the peak) and remains signicant throughout the 20 quarters considered. The responses
of government spending and tax revenues are qualitatively similar to the linear case.
The bottom panel (in red) of Figure 3 shows the response to the same shock during
times of HU. In striking contrast with the previous case, a positive government spending
shock is associated with a large, signicant and negative response of output. The eect
of the shock is small on impact but it builds up progressively until after the second
year, with an elasticity of  0:48 (which in our sample would imply a peak multiplier of
-4.9). The response of government spending during times of HU has a similar shape to
the linear case during the rst three years, although it exhibits more persistent eects
from the shock.
Next, we consider the case of nonlinearities caused by the state of the business cycle
(Ht takes a value of 1 during periods of R). The responses are shown in Figure 4.
During times of B, the response of output is positive and very similar to the linear
case during the rst three quarters, although the shock now has very temporal eects
and output becomes slightly negative but insignicant during the rest of the horizon.17
During times of R, the response of output to a positive increase in government spending
is instead estimated to be negative. The magnitude of this eect is, however, smaller
than in the case of the HU periods considered earlier (the elasticity at the peak is -0:1).
These results suggest that the response of output to government spending shocks
does not remain the same across all states of the economy. In particular, it becomes
negative when we consider periods of HU or R.
2.2 The Narrative Approach
In this subsection, we use a dierent framework to achieve identication of the govern-
ment spending shocks while retaining the potentially dierent eects of these on the
variables in the system.
The specication described in equation 1 relies on two assumptions: (i) government
spending shocks are a surprise to agents and (ii) government spending cannot react
17Note that this is not the case when we consider a stochastic trend, as in the appendix.
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within one quarter to other shocks aecting the economy. However, it could be the
case that government spending plans are anticipated by agents, which would violate
assumption (i) above. This possible mistiming of events has been voiced as a criticism
of SVAR approaches such as that expressed by equation 1 (Ramey (2011a)). To avoid
this potential issue, we use the measure of news about future government spending (as
a percentage of GDP) described in Ramey (2011a) to identify exogenous shocks.18
Regarding the second assumption, it could be argued that the intervention lag of
one quarter taken by the scal authorities to respond to developments in the economy,
assumed in the previous subsection, is more likely to be violated during times of R
or HU (since it could be the case that governments will act faster in passing bills in
such times). This would cause a problem of a lack of exogeneity. The use of narrative
identication of shocks using news about defence spending again allows us to deal with
this problem, since the defence news variable is more likely to be driven by exogenous
foreign political events, wars, etc (Ramey (2011a)).
We now estimate a VAR that explicitly incorporates the structural shocks to gov-
ernment spending, namely "Rameyt , or news about defence spending:
xt = B(L)xt 1 +C(L)Ht"
Ramey
t +D(L)(1 Ht)"Rameyt + t (5)
As before, B(L) is a lag polynomial of order p and C(L) and D(L) are lag poly-
nomials of order q.19 t is a residual with normal distribution. As in equation 1, the
above model allows for government spending shocks to have dierential eects, both
dynamically and on impact, depending on the evolution of features of the economy
controlled by Ht.
20 However, the key dierence from the model in equation 1 is that
the structural shocks "Rameyt are now assumed to be observable variables.
21
When we exclude dierential eects of government spending shocks due to economic
conditions (i.e. Ht = 0 for all periods), equation 5 reduces to the standard linear case
considered in Ramey (2011a):
18Ramey (2011a) constructs a time series of the expected discounted values of government spending
changes by obtaining quantitative information about estimated defence spending from periodicals
(hence its name of narrative identication). A simpler approach based on the same strategy can be
found in Ramey and Shapiro (1998), where the authors use war dates to identify exogenous changes
in defence spending.
19Following similar studies such as Romer and Romer (2010), we set q = 12.
20When Ht takes a value of 1, the contemporaneous and dynamic eects of the shock "
Ramey
t are
given by the matrix C(L). Conversely, when Ht = 0 these eects are controlled by the matrix D(L).
21Section 3 relaxes the assumption that the structural shocks "Rameyt are perfectly observable and
considers the case of shocks measured with error.
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xt = B(L)xt 1 + F (L)"
Ramey
t + t (6)
To compare our results to others in the literature, we start by estimating equation 6.
Figure 5 shows the responses of the variables in the system to a positive shock in
government spending that raises government spending by 1% at its peak. As before,
the gure also shows the 68% and 95% condence intervals, computed using a non-
parametric bootstrap method. The response of output peaks after the second year with
an elasticity of 0.47 (multiplier of 0.52), although it is mostly insignicantly dierent
from 0 throughout the horizon (20 quarters). Ramey (2011a) nds a positive and
signicant response of output when including data from WWII (and other controls,
such as the interest rate), although she also nds a similar response to the one found
here when excluding both WWII and the Korean War. She concludes that the variable
of defence shocks is not informative enough for the post-Korean-War sample.
The results change dramatically when we allow for nonlinear eects as considered
in equation 5. Figure 6 show the responses to a positive shock to government spending
for the case where Ht takes a value of 1 during periods of HU as described above.
Interestingly, responses of output during both states (LU in the top panel in blue, and
HU in the bottom panel in red) are now mostly signicant. The signs of the responses
follow the same pattern as in the previous subsection, with output reacting positively to
a government spending shock during LU, and negatively during HU. In periods of LU,
following a positive shock to government spending, output grows by 0.049 and peaks
together with government spending before the second year, with an implied elasticity
of 0.18 (equivalent to a multiplier of 0.54 on impact and one of about 2 at the peak).
Despite the dierence between the two identication approaches, the responses during
HU are very similar to those obtained using the Blanchard-Perotti restrictions. Output
falls by almost -0.04 on impact and reaches -0.4 at the end of the rst year (which
implies an impact multiplier of -0.4, and -4.35 at the peak).
Surprisingly, while the linear estimation (Figure 5) showed little response of output
to a government spending shock, the nonlinear estimation uncovers a very dierent sce-
nario: output reacts positively (and strongly) during times of LU and negatively during
times of HU (in a magnitude very similar to that found in the previous identication
approach).
Figure 7 shows the responses when Ht takes a value of 1 during periods of R. Again,
the response of output is signicantly dierent from 0 at most forecast horizons (as
opposed to in the linear case). Output reacts positively to a government spending
shock during times of B: it peaks at 0.13 together with government spending at the end
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of the third year, implying a multiplier of 1.4. The response of output is negative when
the shock happens during a time of R, although in this case the response is noticeably
larger in magnitude (elasticity of -0.7). The responses of government spending, as in
the case of HU and LU, are persistent.
The narrative identication approach corroborates the results obtained in the pre-
vious subsection: the response of output to a government spending shock depends on
the evolution of features of the economy such as the level of uncertainty or the state of
the business cycle. The nonlinear estimation also oers a dierent view to that of the
linear case when using the Ramey (2011a) narrative variable, showing that government
spending is in fact a powerful instrument in stimulating output (during times of B or
LU).
2.3 Understanding the Results
Why do high levels of uncertainty or a recessionary economy aect the impact of ex-
ogenous changes in government spending? The above analysis suggests that there is a
mechanism that operates dierently when the economy is in a state of HU (or R). In
this subsection, we consider the role of a change in condence as the device inducing
the diering responses in the empirical analysis.22
We interpret a shift from times of LU to HU as a deterioration in the information
set available to agents.23 In a context of scarce information, households may become
more cautious, rendering their condence sensitive to signals that may conrm their
pessimism about their future income levels.
In such a situation, an increase in government spending could serve to corroborate
the idea that the productivity of the economy was low, triggering a shift to pessimism
among households. The likely result of the deterioration in households' condence
would be that consumption would decrease in view of potentially low levels of income.
Firms would respond to this decrease in demand by lowering production and prices,
which would have a contractionary eect on the overall economy.
22We focus on a mechanism that acts dierently during times of HU and times of LU (rather than
during times of B and times of R). Although uncertainty could be endogenously generated during R
(see Bloom (2014) for a discussion), the denition of periods of HU here is mostly based on exogenous
events (Bloom (2009)), which makes uncertainty a better candidate with which to explain the above
results. Since periods of HU and R do not always overlap, we could test which is the ultimate driving
force behind the diering responses observed above (heightened uncertainty or a slack economy).
Unfortunately, the data are too scarce for us to draw conclusive results on this.
23This can be due to scarce information or a reduction in its accuracy. As dened by Frank Knight
(1921), uncertainty is found in situations where agents cannot attach probability distributions to some
events. This represents the inability of agents to form accurate predictions about, for example, the
level of productivity in the economy or the income levels expected by households.
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To support this conjecture, we analyse the responses of some relevant variables
to a government spending shock.24 Figure 8 shows the responses of three measures
of condence to a government spending shock during times of LU and HU. The rst
two columns correspond to the Consumer Condence Index (CCI) and the Index of
Consumer Sentiment (ICS), two popular measures of households' condence.25 Both
variables react positively to a government spending shock when it takes place during
a time of LU, but decrease when shocks occur during times of HU (the CCI decreases
markedly and signicantly while the ICS does so in a less signicant manner). The
third column of Figure 8 plots the response of an indicator of industrial condence in
the manufacturing sector (the Business Conditions Indicator from the OECD), which
behaves similarly. This evidence suggests that government spending shocks lower the
condence of agents if they occur during times of heightened uncertainty, while they
boost their condence during normal times.
This shift towards pessimism translates into a higher demand for precautionary sav-
ings by households. Figure 9 shows a signicant reduction in consumption in response
to government spending shocks during times of HU. In such a scenario, rms would
optimally respond to declining demand by lowering prices. This is consistent with the
second column of Figure 9, which shows that actual (dashed line) and expected (solid
line) ination do not react signicantly to the shock during LU, but they decline when
the shock occurs during a time of HU.26 The last column of Figure 9 shows the re-
sponse of interest rates to a government spending shock. As could be expected from
the response of the monetary authority to developments in ination, the interest rate
declines after a shock during a time of HU (and remains roughly constant after a shock
that occurs in a time of LU).
24We use narrative identication based on Ramey's news about defence spending. Following Burnside
et al. (2004) and Ramey (2011a), we use the xed set of variables xt described above and rotate the
new variables of interest into the analysis.
25The CCI measures consumer condence by using the monthly responses of 5,000 US households
to questions on their current and expected (within the next six months) business, family income and
employment conditions. The CCI is computed as the proportion of participants that respond positively
to these questions. Data for this variable is available from 1967 Q1 onwards. Similarly, the ICS is
computed by combining the proportions of interviewed people who express favourable opinions on their
current and expected (within the next twelve months) nancial situation and the business conditions
in the country, on their expectations for the next ve years about the economic situation, and about
their purchases of durable goods in the current period. The ICS uses responses from 500 telephone
interviews and is available from 1960 Q1 onwards.
26Expected ination is measured by the median ination forecast over the next 12 months from
the Survey of Consumers (University of Michigan). The results are qualitatively similar when we use
ination forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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2.4 Relation to Other Studies
Our empirical results suggest that government spending shocks have negative eects on
output during recessions. Other studies arrive at the opposite conclusion: recessions
make government spending more expansionary than booms. In order to understand
why these ndings are so dierent, we now compare our results with those of Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012), whose study is one of the most prominent in this area.27
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) use a Smooth-Transition VAR to investigate
the variation in the response of output between periods of R and B. They estimate the
following model:
xt =
 
1 HAGt 1

CB(L)xt 1 +HAGt 1CRxt 1 + et (7)
HAGt =
exp( zt)
1 + exp( zt) (8)
et  N
 
0;
B
 
1 HAGt 1

+
R
 
HAGt 1

(9)
var(zt) = 1 , E(zt) = 0 (10)
where xt is the same vector of variables as dened above. The model allows for a
dierential impact of the government spending shock both contemporaneously (through
matrices 
B and 
R) and dynamically (through matrices CB(L) and CR(L)) during
booms and recessions. The transition between these two states is governed by a logistic
function HAGt that depends on the variable zt, which is dened as the centred moving
average (MA) of order 7 of the growth rate of real GDP.
Despite an apparently similar framework, the results generated by the two dier-
ent estimation approaches (the model described by equation 7 and those described by
equations 1 and 5) are very dierent: Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) nd that
a government spending shock that occurs during a time of R has a positive and larger
eect than the same shock occurring during a time of B.
Why do similar estimation methods yield such contrasting results? The answer
to this question rests on the information used to determine the current state of the
economy. Equation 7 uses a continuous variable determined by a centred MA of the
growth rate of real GDP, while equation 1 includes a binary variable that follows the
27Ramey and Zubairy (2014) propose a dierent estimation method using local projections (see
Section 3) and historical data from 1889 to 2011. They nd no signicant dierences in responses
during periods of B and R. However, when their methodology and data are used for the post-War
period used in this paper, the results are very similar to those presented in Section 2 (with output
contracting after positive government spending shocks during times of R).
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NBER denition of recession.28 Constructing HAGt 1 in equation 7 in such a way has
potentially important implications. By using a centred MA of order j (a two-sided MA
lter), at any given period of time, we are making use of future developments in GDP
to inform about the current state of the economy. For example, in period t, whether the
economy is in recession or expansion will be determined by information up to period
t + (j   1)=2. In the event of an incoming change in the business cycle (e.g. from an
expansion to a recession), we could potentially be mislabelling the current state of the
economy.
In order to determine whether the nature of the two-sided MA lter can explain
the dierences between the two sets of results, we replicate the benchmark analysis in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) for dierent sizes of the centred MA of the growth
rate of real GDP. Figure 10 shows the responses of GDP and government spending to
a positive shock to the latter during times of B and R when varying the size of the MA
from 5 up to 19. The results suggest that the impact of the shock on GDP does depend
on the size of the MA lter: using a high-order MA (i.e. using more information that
has not yet occurred) reduces the eect of the shock during times of B (with the eect
even becoming negative in the medium run) and augments it during times of R. When
the size of the benchmark specication in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) (a MA
of order 7) is reduced to a MA of order 5, the results become qualitatively the same as
those described earlier in this paper: a government spending shock has a positive eect
on GDP during times of B and a negative eect during times of R.
Next, we analyse how the results in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) would
be aected if the centred MA were substituted by a one-sided MA lter (i.e. keeping
the length of the MA lter constant, but altering its symmetry). Figure 11 shows the
responses to a government spending shock when we use (i) the benchmark specication
(centred MA of order 7), (ii) a one-sided MA lter of order 7 that only uses past
information and (iii) a one-sided MA lter that exclusively uses future information.29
The results conrm that, when not using information about the future (i.e. when the
MA is only backward-looking), the response of output becomes more similar to those
obtained from equations 1 and 5: a government spending shock has positive eects
during a period of B, but negative ones during a period of R (while the opposite is true
when a forward-looking MA lter is used).
We conclude that the dierences between the results presented in this paper and
those in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) respond to the information used to explain
28When we redene HAGt 1 in equation 7 to be a dummy variable, the results are qualitatively similar.
29Cases in between these two extremes (e.g a MA(7) lter that uses information from the last two
quarters and the next four quarters) support the same conclusions.
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changes in the state of the economy.30
3 Robustness
3.1 Alternative Timing of Uncertainty Events
In this subsection we analyse the sensitivity of the results to changes in the denition of
the episodes of HU. In Section 2, these were dened as quarters containing any month
with unusually high stock market volatility (1.65 standard deviations above a Hodrick-
Prescott trend). The advantage of this approach is that it produces a larger number of
periods of HU (32 quarters). We now strictly apply the denition of episodes of HU in
Bloom (2009) and consider only those quarters that contain months of peak volatility.31
To assess whether this change of denition aects our results, we estimate equa-
tions 1 and 5 again using the alternative denition of HU. Figure 12 displays the results
of a government spending shock identied using the SVAR approach (equation 1). The
response of the variables during times of LU is almost unchanged between the alter-
native (solid line) and benchmark (dashed line) denition of episodes of uncertainty.
During times of HU, the response of output is fairly similar for both denitions during
the rst two years after the shock. The most noticeable dierence is that the alternative
denition produces more persistent eects of the shock.
Next, we consider the case of the narrative identication of government spending
shocks (equation 5). Figure 13 plots the results for this case. The responses of the
variables during LU is are almost identical for both denitions of uncertainty. When
considering times of HU, the response of output is again very similar in each case during
the rst two years. The magnitude of the decline in output is larger for the alternative
denition (dashed line) between the second and fth years of the horizon.
We can conclude that the nding of dierent signs of the responses of output during
times of HU and LU is robust when we consider uncertainty episodes as dened by
quarters of peak stock market volatility.
30Bognanni (2012) uses a Markov-switching VAR where the probability of recession is estimated
period by period, and nds that the eect of a government spending shock on activity is smaller
during periods of R than B.
31For example, from 2002 Q3 to 2003 Q1 stock market volatility was 1.65 standard deviations above
the trend, due to the second Gulf War. In our benchmark denition of episodes of HU this resulted
in three quarters of HU. In the alternative denition proposed now, we only consider the quarter with
the highest volatility (in this case, 2003 Q1).
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3.2 Local Projections
Equations 1 and 5 both imply restrictions on the responses of the variables to struc-
tural shocks. Responses are linear when conditioning on a given state and are therefore
history-independent. This is equivalent to assuming that scal policy, through govern-
ment spending, cannot change the regime from HU to LU (or from R to B) or vice
versa. While uncertainty is dened here as exogenous events (most of the episodes of
HU are not economics-related), these events are mostly short-lived. It is also plausible
to believe that government spending can inuence the economic situation. Although
these shortcomings are less likely to appear in the short run, we follow Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) in using a methodology that
takes these issues into account. We use the local projection methodology proposed
in Jorda (2005), which relaxes the assumption that the state of the nonlinear model
remains xed throughout the entire horizon of the impulse response analysis.
The local projection methodology estimates a series of single equations over the
horizon h:
xt+h = Ht 1

L;h + L;hxt 1 + L;h"Gt

+
(1 Ht 1)

H;h + H;hxt 1 + H;h"Gt

+ et+h
(11)
where xt = [gt; yt; trt]
0 is the vector of variables dened in the previous section and xt
is one of the variables of interest in xt. Note that equation 11 allows for the coecients
to change for each horizon h. The coecient L;h measures the response of the variable
xt to a government spending shock "
G
t during state L (which represents times of LU or
B) and, conversely, H;h captures the response during state H (times of HU or R). The
responses of the variable of interest to government spending shocks during state L (or
H) are given by a series of L;h (or H;h) obtained from each regression h.
We apply the above method using both of our identication schemes mentioned
earlier. Thus, "Gt represents either the government spending variable (to achieve the
Blanchard-Perotti SVAR identication) or Ramey's news about defence spending (nar-
rative identication).
Figure 14 shows the responses to a government spending shock identied as in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) when equation 11 is allowed to vary between states of
HU or LU. The response of output is positive and signicant during times of LU. During
times of HU, the point estimate (solid line) is not signicant during the rst two years
and then becomes negative. This gure also displays the point estimate when the
episodes of HU are identied using the alternative measure of uncertainty explained
in the previous subsection (dashed line). This estimate is negative and signicant
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(condence intervals for this estimation are not shown) throughout the entire impulse
response horizon.
We now replicate the same analysis but using the narrative identication approach
for the government spending shock. Figure 15 displays the responses. As in the previous
case, the response of output is positive and mostly signicant during times of LU. The
sign of this response becomes negative and signicant when the shock happens during a
time of HU. The same result obtains when we consider the alternative denition of HU
(dashed line) although the magnitude of the decline in output is signicantly larger.32
Finally, we consider the business cycle conditions (R or B) to be the drivers of the
nonlinearities in equation 11. Figure 16 plots the responses to government spending
shocks identied using the SVAR framework. In times of B, the response of output is
positive and mostly signicant. During times of R, the response is negative during the
rst year but only signicant up to 68%, and then uctuates for the rest of the horizon
considered (increasing after the fourth year).
Figure 17 displays the responses when the government spending shock is identied
following the narrative approach. The response of output is positive but small during
times of B. During times of R, output declines during the rst year and remains negative
or close to zero up to the fourth year (after which it increases), although the levels of
signicance are low.
To summarise, the local projection framework shows that the nonlinear responses
due to dierent levels of uncertainty are not caused by the restriction imposed by the
VAR (i.e. the state remaining xed for the whole impulse response horizon). The
results are, however, less clear when we consider nonlinearities due to the state of the
business cycle.
3.3 Alternative Identication Strategy
In this subsection we use a dierent strategy to identify the government spending shocks.
In Section 2 we used the Ramey (2011a) narrative shock of news about defence spending
as the true structural shock to government spending. One might suppose that this series
could be contaminated by measurement errors. We now follow Mertens and Ravn (2013)
and consider the possibility that the narrative shocks are not the true structural shocks
but a measure correlated with them. We assume as well that this measure, the proxy,
is orthogonal to other structural shocks. These assumptions give us extra identication
restrictions (exploiting the correlation between the proxy and the reduced form residuals
32Note that these responses, unlike those shown in Section 2, are not scaled to the government
spending shock, since we are estimating single equations.
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of the SVAR) that can be used in conjunction with the covariance restrictions from the
VAR in equation 1 to identify the structural shocks to government spending.33
Figure 18 plots the responses when using this alternative identication, for the
case of HU versus LU. The response of output follows a similar pattern to that in the
benchmark results: it increases as a result of a government spending shock during a
time of LU but becomes negative when the shock takes place during a time of HU, with
a magnitude very similar to the results presented in Section 2.
Next we consider the case of responses to government spending shocks during times
of R or B.34 Figure 19 shows that the response of output is positive during times of
B. Output declines during times of R, with an implied elasticity of the output peak
to the government spending peak of -0.3% after the rst year. The magnitude of this
response falls between the results obtained in Section 2 for the SVAR and narrative
identication approaches.
3.4 Alternative Narrative Measure
In Section 2 we used the Ramey (2011a) news about defence spending as the govern-
ment spending shocks. Ramey (2011a) produces a second narrative measure: news
shocks based on the one-quarter-ahead forecast error of defence spending by profes-
sional forecasters.35 Ramey (2011a) reports that shocks to this variable are associated
with decreasing output.36 We nd similar results when we estimate the linear version
of equation 5 with these shocks (as shown in Figure 20).37
We want to investigate whether the response of output is still qualitatively dierent
across states when we consider this alternative identication of government spending
shocks. We estimate equation 5, allowing for nonlinearities due to periods of HU or LU
but using the new narrative measure. Figure 21 shows the responses after a government
spending shock in this case. During times of LU the response of output is positive on
impact, before becoming negative and then insignicant (the point estimation becomes
positive again after the third year, in contrast with the linear case displayed in Figure 20
33Note that we no longer need the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) exclusion restrictions on the con-
temporaneous impact of a government spending shock in order to achieve identication.
34We nd that the results during times of B are very imprecisely estimated when we include the
recession of 1949. In this particular case we consider 1950 Q1 as the starting date of our sample. The
results for the case of Rare not dependent on this consideration.
35Ramey (2011a) suggests that the explanatory power of the defence news variables may be lower
when the sample starts after WWII and the Korean War (we include only the latter), the two major
events of increases in government spending.
36Ramey says: \these shocks lead to rather contractionary eects, similar to those I found for the
1955 to 2008 period with my defence news shocks", a statement that we have illustrated in Figure 5.
37The sample starts in 1969 Q1, restricted by the availability of the data.
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in which it remained negative during the entire period). When considering the response
of output during times of HU, we again observe a large and signicant decline following
the shock, as in the results presented in Section 2.
We now consider the case of the impact of a government spending shock during
times of R and B. Figure 22 shows the responses for this case. We again observe an
initially positive response of output during times of B, becoming negative (and then
insignicant) after the third quarter. The response of output during times of R is
negative and signicant, as observed in the benchmark results.
4 Conclusion
The eect of government spending is likely to depend on features of the economy that
evolve over time. In this paper, we study whether the eects of changes in government
spending remain the same across states of the economy. In particular, we empirically
characterise how changes in government spending may dier across states of high (HU)
and low (LU) uncertainty and across recessions (R) and booms (B).
Our results suggest that the impact of government spending shocks on output is
positive during times of LU or B and negative during times of HU or R. We nd that
households' condence is a key variable for interpreting these results, as agents become
more pessimistic when a positive government spending shock conrms their views on
the state of the economy.
Other studies in the literature (such as Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)) pro-
duce contrasting results. We explore these dierences by highlighting the importance
of the information used to determine the state of the business cycle.
The results documented here provoke new research questions. For example, we
have seen that output contracts after a positive government spending shock if that
shock happens during a time of HU or R. It would be interesting to identify whether
it is HU, R or a combination of both that is causing this eect. This would require
a comparison between a shock that happens in a time of HU and B and a shock that
happens during a time of LU and R. However, the data are not informative enough for
this, since there are just a few events with these characteristics, insucient for us to
obtain robust results. More empirical evidence is required to help us shed light on this
question.
It is also necessary to understand the mechanism causing these diering impacts
of government spending on the economy. Here we have highlighted the importance of
households' condence in explaining the results. A detailed theoretical framework that
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can explain such nonlinear eects would be crucial for evaluating the consequences of
public policies.
We have focused our attention on uncertainty that has an arguably exogenous origin
(e.g. war, terror). However, uncertainty can be generated by endogenous causes, for
example by policy itself (see Baker et al. (2013), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) or
Bi et al. (2013)).38 Whether and how this source of scal uncertainty can aect real
activity are questions left for future research.
38Uncertainty derived from scal policy has received attention from the media recently. See, for
example, The Economist (16/11/2013):\Governments, however, are still breeding fears about the future.
The most glaring form of uncertainty in the rich world is scal. [...] This is self-imposed uncertainty.
If the scal path were a little clearer, the reduction in uncertainty should spur investment and output,
which in turn should improve the scal picture."
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Figure 1: Periods of HU and R between 1948 Q1 and 2007 Q4
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Figure 2: Responses in the linear model (SVAR identication)
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Responses to a government spending shock (identied with exclusion restrictions) in a linear model.
68% and 95% condence bands computed with a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 3: Responses during times of LU and HU (SVAR identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied with exclusion
restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during
times of high uncertainty. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric
bootstrap.
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Figure 4: Responses during times of B and R (SVAR identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied with exclusion re-
strictions) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of recession.
The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 5: Responses in the linear model (narrative identication)
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Responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative accounts of defence spending) in
a linear model. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 6: Responses during times of LU and HU (narrative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative
accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows
responses during times of high uncertainty. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a
non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 7: Responses during times of B and R (narrative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative
accounts of defence spending) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses
during times of recession. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric
bootstrap.
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Figure 8: Measures of condence during times of HU and LU (narrative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows the responses of dierent measures of consumers' and rms' condence
to a government spending shock (identied from narrative accounts of defence spending) during times
of low uncertainty. The measures of condence include the Consumer Condence Index (CCI) provided
by the Conference Board (data start in 1967 Q1), the Index of Consumer Sentiment provided by the
University of Michigan (data start in 1960 Q1) and the Business Conditions Indicator from the OECD
(data start in 1950 Q1). The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty.
The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 9: Further responses during times of HU and LU (narrative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows the responses of dierent measures of consumers' condence to a gov-
ernment spending shock (identied from narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of low
uncertainty. The broken lines represent realised ination, as measured by the Consumer Price Index.
Expected ination is measured by the median ination forecast over the next 12 months from the
Survey of Consumers (University of Michigan). Interest rates are measured using the three-month
Treasury bill. The bottom panel (in red) shows the responses during times of high uncertainty. The
68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 10: Responses during times of R and B using the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) framework and a two-sided MA lter
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of boom. The
bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of recession. Note that the graphs in the left column
have a dierent scale to facilitate their readability. The responses are computed using the strategy
described in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) but with variations in the size of the centred moving
average of the growth rate of real GDP used to provide information about changes in the regime.
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Figure 11: Responses during times of R and B using the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) framework and a one-sided MA lter
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of boom. The
bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of recession. The responses are computed using the
strategy described in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) but with variations made to the centring of
the moving average (MA) of the growth rate of real GDP used to provide information about changes in
the regime. Forward MA(7) is a one-sided MA lter of order 7 using future information only; backward
MA(7) is a one-sided MA lter of order 7 using exclusively past information.
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Figure 12: Responses under alternative denition of HU events (SVAR identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from exclusion
restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times
of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point estimates for the alternative denition of HU events.
The dashed lined plots the point estimates for the benchmark denition used in Section 2. The 68%
and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 13: Responses under alternative denition of HU events (Narrative identica-
tion)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative
accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows
responses during times of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point estimates for the alternative
denition of HU events. The dashed lined plots the point estimates for the benchmark denition used
in Section 2. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 14: Responses during times of LU and HU computed using local projections
(SVAR identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied using exclusion
restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times
of high uncertainty. Responses are computed using the local projection method as described in Jorda
(2005). The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 15: Responses during times of LU and HU, computed using local projections
(narrative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative
accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows
responses during times of high uncertainty. The responses are computed using the local projection
method as described in Jorda (2005). The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a
non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 16: Responses during times of B and R, computed using local projections (SVAR
identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied using exclusion
restrictions) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of re-
cession. The responses are computed using the local projection method as described in Jorda (2005).
The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 17: Responses during times of B and R, computed using local projections (nar-
rative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative
accounts of defence spending) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses
during times of recession. The responses are computed using the local projection method as described
in Jorda (2005). The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 18: Responses during times of LU and HU (proxy identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of low uncer-
tainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty. Government
spending shocks are identied using the Ramey (2011a) news about defence spending as a proxy for
the true structural shocks. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using the Goncalves and
Kilian (2004) wild bootstrap.
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Figure 19: Proxy identication, R versus B
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of B. The
bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of R. Government spending shocks are identied
using the Ramey (2011a) news about defence spending as a proxy for the true structural shocks. The
68% and 95% condence bands are computed using the Goncalves and Kilian (2004) wild bootstrap.
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Figure 20: Responses in the linear case (alternative narrative identication)
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Responses in the linear model after a government spending shock identied using Ramey (2011a)
defence spending forecast errors. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-
parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 21: Responses during periods of HU and LU (alternative narrative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of low uncer-
tainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty. Government
spending shocks are identied using Ramey (2011a) defence spending forecast errors. The 68% and
95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 22: Responses during periods of R and B (alternative narrative identication)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of boom. The
bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of recession. Government spending shocks are
identied using Ramey (2011a) defence spending forecast errors. The 68% and 95% condence bands
are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Appendix
A. Data
The following data are obtained from the BEA's NIPA tables (last revision on 20
December 2013)
 Output is Gross Domestic Product from Table 1.1.5 (line 1).
 Government Spending is Federal Government Consumption Expenditures and
Gross Investment from Table 3.9.5 (line 9).
 Total Tax Revenues are Federal Current Tax Receipts from Table 3.2 (line 2) plus
Contributions for Government Social Insurance from Table 3.2 (line 11) minus
Taxes on Corporate Income taxes from Federal Reserve Banks from Table 3.2
(line 8).
 Consumption is Personal Consumption Expenditures from Table 1.1.5 (line 2).
All these variables are expressed in real terms, deated by the GDP deator from Table
1.1.9 (line 1), and in per capita terms (divided by the civilian population aged 16 or
more from Francis and Ramey (2009)).
Data from other sources:
 Consumer Condence Index. Source: Conference Board (obtained via Thomson
Reuters Datastream).
 Index of Consumer Sentiment. Source: Survey of Consumers, Thomson Reuters/University
of Michigan.
 Business Condence Indicator (industrial condence in the manufacturing sector).
Source: OECD (obtained via Thomson Reuters Datastream).
 Consumer Price Index. Source: BLS.
 Expected Ination. Median expected price change during the next 12 months.
Source: Survey of Consumers, Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan.
 Interest Rates. 3-Month Treasury Bill (Secondary Market Rate). Source: Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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B. Robustness: Trend Specications
In Section 2, both equations 1 and 5 incorporate linear and quadratic trends, with the
vector of variables xt being in levels. In this subsection we reestimate these models,
allowing for a stochastic trend by including the vector of variables in rst dierences
(and omitting the deterministic trends).
Figure A1 compares the responses to government spending shocks identied with
exclusion restrictions, in specications with stochastic trends (solid lines) and with
deterministic trends (dashed lines), during periods of HU and LU. In the latter case
(LU), the only noticeable dierence is the permanent eect of the shock on government
spending when allowing for stochastic trends. During times of HU, output shows a very
similar pattern in both specications during the rst two years. After that, the eect
of the shock starts to disappear in the benchmark specication (dashed lines) while the
eect is permanent in the stochastic trends specication.
Similar results are obtained when we consider the dierent eects in times of B and
R (Figure A4). Interestingly, output remains positive and signicant during times of
B for the entire horizon, as opposed to what happens in the benchmark specication
(where the eect of the shock lasts for about a year). When allowing for stochastic
trends, the shock has permanent eects on government spending during both R and
B times. The responses of output during times of R are very similar in both trend
specications.
The same conclusions are reached when we repeat the analysis for the case of a
government spending shock identied using narrative methods (equation 5). The re-
sponses during HU and LU (Figure A3) and during R and B (Figure A2) are fairly
similar regardless of the assumption of deterministic or stochastic trends. During both
R and HU, the response of output shows permanent eects when stochastic trends are
considered, while the eects of the shock are temporary in the benchmark specication.
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Figure A1: Responses during HU and LU (SVAR identication, specication in rst
dierences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied using exclusion
restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times
of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point estimates for the alternative specication using rst
dierences. The dashed line plots the point estimates for the benchmark denition used in Section 2
with variables in levels. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric
bootstrap.
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Figure A2: Responses during R and B (SVAR identication, specication in rst dif-
ferences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied using exclusion
restrictions) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of reces-
sion. The solid line plots the point estimates for the alternative specication using rst dierences.
The dashed line plots the point estimates for the benchmark denition used in Section 2 with variables
in levels. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure A3: Responses during HU and LU (narrative identication, specication in rst
dierences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative
accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows
responses during times of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point estimates for the alternative
specication using rst dierences. The dashed line plots the point estimates for the benchmark
denition used in Section 2 with variables in levels. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed
using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure A4: Responses during R and B (narrative identication, specication in rst
dierences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identied from narrative
accounts of defence spending) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during
times of recession. The solid line plots the point estimates for the alternative specication using rst
dierences. The dashed line plots the point estimates for the benchmark denition used in Section 2
with variables in levels. The 68% and 95% condence bands are computed using a non-parametric
bootstrap.
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